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Directors' Duty of Care
in Eastern Europe
As privatization speeds up in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
many state-owned enterprises are being transformed into public limited compa-
nies.' Their shares are already being traded on the new or resurrected stock
exchanges in Warsaw, Prague, Moscow, Budapest, and Sofia.2 And it is clear
that in the future public limited companies, or joint stock companies, or companies
limited by shares-the latter comparable to U.S. publicly held corporations, En-
glish public limited companies, or German Aktiengesellschaft (AktG)-will be
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the most important forms of business organization both in terms of capital and
number of employees.
At the same time, after more than four decades the countries of Eastern Europe
have enacted or reenacted commercial and corporate laws.3 The latter closely
follow American and Western European models of corporate governance. 4 It will
be interesting to see how these inchoate provisions related to the administration
of the corporation and the duties of corporate bodies will be implemented and
interpreted by the judiciary.
The European Communities, now the European Union (EU), have been
striving for years to harmonize their company laws.5 Moreover, harmonization
3. The article will focus on the commercial and corporate laws of:
Bulgaria: Turgovski Zakon [Law on Commerce], DURZHAVEN VESTNIK No. 48 (1991), translated
in 1 CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav Pechota ed., 1993) [hereinafter
Bulgarian Law on Commerce].
The Czech Republic & the Republic of Slovakia: Obchodni Zakonik [Czechoslovak Commercial
Code of 1991)] [hereinafter Czechoslovak Commercial Code], translated in 2 DAVID E. BIRENBAUM,
BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter BUSINESS VENTURES
IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA]. The Commercial Code continues to be effective in the territories
of the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia as long as it is not repealed by the National
Councils. See infra note 27.
Hungary: Torveny a Gazdasagi Tarsasagokrol [Act VI of 1988 on Business Organizations], trans-
lated in 3 HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE No. 3-4 (Feb. 1-15, 1992), reprinted in BUSINESS
VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA, supra [hereinafter Hungarian Company Act].
Poland: Decree of the President of the Republic, June 27, 1934, DZIENNIK USTAW [Dz.U.] (1934)
57/502, amended by Dz.U. (1946) 57/321, (1950) 34/312, (1964) 16/94, (1969) 13/95, (1988) 41/
326, (1990) 17/98 [hereinafter Commercial Code of Poland] (unofficial translation available from
William K. Sievers of the law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York and Warsaw).
4. See, e.g., George Glos, The New Czechoslovak Commercial Code, 18 REV. CENT. & E.
EUR. L. 555 (1992); Boris Landjev, The New Bulgarian Commercial Code, 18 REV. CENT. & E.
EUR. L. 367 (1992); BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA, supra note 3, at 3-38,
4-49 & 5-33.
5. The European Community was founded on the ideal that through harmonization and coordina-
tion the states of Europe could be brought together into a political union as well as a single common
market. To achieve this goal, the founders of the EC realized that divergent company laws must be
realigned so as to provide individuals with essentially the same safeguards and protection of interests
within the Community. Harmonization is carried out by directives based on article 54(3)(g) of the
Treaty of Rome. According to this provision, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission
and in cooperation with the European Parliament, shall issue directives in order to coordinate "to
the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others,
are required by the Member States of companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph
of Article 58 with a view of making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community." Treaty
of Rome, 1957, art. 54(3)(g).
Company law has been among the more successful areas of harmonization of the laws of Community
Member States. The stimulus, however, toward such harmonization has slackened somewhat in recent
years, the stumbling blocks being worker participation and takeovers. The goals laid down in the
Commission's White Paper, COM(85)310 final, for creating a 1992 internal market have not been
achieved. The measures now being contemplated are aimed at a lesser degree of detailed regulation
in the field of company law.
For a comprehensive discussion of the notions of integration and harmonization in the field of company
law, see ERIC STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS (1971); RICHARD BUXBAUM &
KLAUS HoPIr, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1988); EUROPEAN BUSINESS
LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 199-226 (Richard
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is needed and is pending with respect to the fiduciary duties of corporate
directors.6
Following the sweeping political changes, most of the Eastern European countries
signed association agreements with the EU, setting forth the principles and mechanics
of future political and economic integration into the Common Market.7 One of the
goals to be pursued by the Eastern European countries during the term of these
association agreements is harmonization and the bringing of their laws into compli-
ance with the standards set by the Union.8 This endeavor will encompass their
commercial and company laws, including the fiduciary duties of directors.
This article examines the standards of skill and care that should be followed
by directors of public limited companies in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and France and compares them with statutory provisions adopted by
some Eastern European countries. It begins with a review of the corporate gover-
nance structure of the joint stock companies adopted by Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, the Republic of Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. It then proceeds with
an analysis of the director's standard of care in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany, and France. It concludes with a commentary on the liability
of corporate directors for negligence, and the standard of skill and care elaborated
in the new commercial codes of the above-mentioned market-oriented economies.
The conclusion contains a proposal for a more detailed and clearer statutory
definition of the standard in the codes. Consideration is given to how the standard
should be interpreted and enforced in order to provide for both better shareholder
protection and the freedom of managers to embrace more risk. Contrary to the
Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991); FRANK WOOLDRIDGE, COMPANY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: ITS HARMONIZATION AND UNIFICATION (1991); Alfred Conard, The European
Alternative to Uniformity in Corporation Laws, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2150 (1991).
For analysis and information on the current status of European Community legislation in relation
to company law see 2 GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES 38-001 (A. J. Boyle & Richard Sykes eds.,
44th ed. 1986). See also, e.g., EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS (Robert Drury & Peter Xuereb eds., 1991);
ROBERT PENNINGTON & FRANK WOOLDRIDGE, COMPANY LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (3d
ed. 1982).
6. EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTEGRATION AND HARMO-
NIZATION, supra note 5, at 211-12.
7. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Republic of Slovakia were first to sign associa-
tion agreements with the European Union (EU) on December 16, 1991. For a general discussion
of the EU association agreements, see EU Association Agreements with Poland, Hungary, and the
CSFR, 3 PARKER SCHOOL SURVEY OF EAST EUROPEAN LAW 1 (June 1992); Frank Benyon, Les
"accords europdens" avec la Hongrie, la Pologne et la Tchdcoslovaquie, 2 REVUE DU MARCHE
UNIQUE EUROPtEN 25 (1992). See COM(92)511 final. The Europe Agreements with Hungary and
Poland entered into force after ratification by all EU Member States on February 1, 1994, and were
published in 1994 O.J. (L 347) (Hungary) and 1994 O.J. (L 349) (Poland). Bulgaria signed a similar
accord on March 9, 1993. See European Association Agreement Signed with Bulgaria, AGENCE
EUROPE, Mar. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, LBYRPT File; see COM(93)45 final.
8. The Europe agreements provide for cooperation on approximation of legislation. Eastern
European countries recognize that compatibility with the EU legislation will stimulate foreign invest-
ment into their markets. See Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern
Europe: Report by the Commission to the European Council, COM(92)2301 final at 6.
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common sentiment in Eastern Europe that less regulation and more managerial
freedom are acceptable when a country is moving toward a market economy, a
proposal for a stricter standard is made. This recommendation recalls the legal
environment in Eastern Europe and the ultimate end of encouraging both foreign
and domestic investment. In this respect the Draft Fifth Directive' is examined,
and the provisions of German, French, and U.S. laws are analyzed and used as
a standard of comparison.
I. The Standard of Skill and Care for Corporate Directors-
A Comparative Analysis
The standard duty of care of corporate directors can generally be considered
as consisting of two duties: the duty to monitor and the duty to make reasonable
decisions.'o The standard varies in different legal systems and the liability for
breach of the duty ranges from mere negligence (France and Germany) to gross
negligence amounting to fraud (the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, the
United States). Likewise, the scope of discretion given to directors to make
decisions varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with the broadest scope probably
being granted by the "business judgment rule" in the United States.
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate fairly which law sets a higher
standard in relation to directors' duties of skill and care. Indeed, this standard
is not only a function of substantive law but also, perhaps to a greater extent,
a function of the applicable rules of procedure." In both respects, the standard
9. Proposal for a Fifth Directive to Coordinate the Safeguards Which, for the Protection of
the Interests of Members and Others, Are Required by Member States of Companies Within the
Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 58 of the EEC Treaty, as Regards the Structure of
Socidtds Anonymes and the Powers and Obligations of their Organs, 1972 J.O. (C 131); Amended
Proposal for a Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty Concerning the Structure
of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of Their Organs, 1983 O.J. (C 240);
Second Amendment to the Proposal for a Fifth Council Directive Based on Article 54 of the EEC
Treaty Concerning the Structure of the Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations
of Their Organs, 1991 O.J. (C 7).
The scope of the Draft Directive encompasses workers' participation in the management of compa-
nies and touches upon the governing structure of companies, the role of the directors, and the rights
of shareholders. The Draft Directive is supposed to apply only to public limited companies.
For an analysis and discussion of the various drafts of the Fifth Directive, see J. Temple Lang,
The Fifth EEC Directive on the Harmonization of Company Law, 12 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 155-70
(1975); Thomas Conlon, Industrial Democracy and EEC Company Law: A Review of the Draft Fifth
Directive, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 348-59 (1975); Jane Welch, The Fifth Draft Directive-A False
Dawn?, 8 EUR. L. REV. 83-102 (1983); Janet Dine, Implications for the United Kingdom of the EC
Fifth Directive, 38 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 547-59 (1989); Frank Wooldridge, The Fifth Draft Directive
on the Harmonization of the Company Law, L. Soc'v GAZETTE 2783-87 (Oct. 10, 1984); Clive
Schmitthoff, Amendments to the Fifth Draft Directive and to Vredeling, J. Bus. L. 453, 456-58
(Nov. 1983).
10. See, e.g., Melvin Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U.
PITT. L. REV. 948, 951, 956 (1990).
11. Bernard Grossfeld, Management and Control of Marketable Share Companies, in 13 INTER-
NATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, BUSINESS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS 4-113
(Alfred Conard ed., 1971).
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is arguably higher in the United States and France and lower in the United King-
dom. The German standard is best viewed as intermediary.
In terms of the substantive provision of law, the standards could be ranked in
the following manner: the strictest standards are imposed in France and Germany,
followed by the United States, and finally by the United Kingdom. Although the
trend is toward imposing a higher standard and increasing investor protection in
Europe, the European Union Draft Fifth Directive and the proposal for the Euro-
pean Corporation do not articulate any standard for skill and care of corporate
directors. Similarly, the standard remains inchoate in the jurisprudence of most
Member States. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the U.S. experience with legal
integration, it might be expected that harmonization will occur in Europe first
through case law and only later by codification. 2 Nevertheless, the dilemma
posed is whether the Member States should wait and leave the development of
similar case law through jurisprudence or whether they should expedite codifica-
tion through directives.
Faced with this impasse, the Eastern European states had no choice. The
recently enacted commercial codes closely copied the existing provisions of the
EU regulations. As a result, the current East European statutory standards are
rather obscure and do not serve to protect investors sufficiently. Furthermore,
the delicate condition of these new market economies, combined with the lack
of experience and the unified EU standard, rules out any adoption of a more
rigorous approach or prescription of a precise duty of skill and care. Accordingly,
in order to fill the void, the courts of Eastern Europe should look to the rich
experience and voluminous case law of the United States when formulating guide-
lines for promoting investor protection, while avoiding oppressive obligations
on directors.
H. The Governing Structure of Public Limited Companies
in Eastern Europe
The structure of corporate governance may do more to control negligence than
the threat of possible court action. The Draft Fifth Directive tried to build on this
notion by offering a choice between two systems. 13 One consists of a two-tiered
structure of corporate governance in which a management board would be respon-
sible for implementing the company's goals and policies on a day-to-day basis,
and the supervisory board would select and remove management and have the
Thus, for example, in France creditors have a direct right of action. Shareholders in Germany
and France have a right of statutory action in the company's name, i.e., derivative suit, against the
director, though there is a requirement that shareholders hold 10% and 5% respectively. See P.
MEINHARD, COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE F-14A(iii) (1981); Vanessa Finch, Who Cares About Skill
and Care?, 55 MOD. L. REV. 179, 204 (1992).
12. BUXBAUM & HoPT, supra note 5, at 272-73. The authors argue that the convergence of the
case law related to the duty of care has started in some of the Member States.
13. 1983 O.J. (C 240), supra note 9, art. 2(1).
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overall responsibility for supervising management's leadership.' 4 The other sys-
tem would consist of a unitary board of directors comprising executive and nonex-
ecutive directors. 5 The supervisory directors in a two-tier system and the nonex-
ecutive directors in a one-tier system of corporate governance would have the
same rights and duties with respect to monitoring the behavior of management. 16
But in the two-tier system the supervisory directors would have absolute veto
power over closure, transfer, extension, or termination of a substantial part of
the business, as well as veto power over any organizational changes or long-term
cooperative undertakings.' 7
All the countries of Eastern Europe, except Bulgaria, which offers a choice
between the two systems, have opted for the two-tier board structure.
A. BULGARIA
The Bulgarian Law on Commerce is the only one of the new codes that gives
discretion to the founders of the joint stock company in setting up the structure
of its corporate governance. They can choose between a one-tier system (board
of directors and executive officer) or a two-tier system (management board and
supervisory board).' 8 Thus, the provisions of law repeat the Draft Fifth Direc-
tive,' 9 which in this aspect was influenced by the French law.2 ° Members of the
management board are appointed and dismissed by the supervisory board in the
two-tier system or by the general meeting of shareholders in the one-tier system.
The number of management board members may vary from one to nine,22 while
the number of supervisory board members must be between three and nine.23
The function of the management board is to manage the company and represent
it in dealings with outsiders. In the case of the one-tier system, the board of
directors must appoint one or more of its members to be executive officers of
the corporation.24
The supervisory board is obliged to exercise monitoring powers and can employ
outside experts for this purpose.25 The supervisory board is not involved in the
management of the company.26
14. Id. art. 3.
15. Id. art. 21a.
16. Id. arts. 11, 21.
17. Id. art. 12.
18. See Bulgarian Law on Commerce, supra note 3, arts. 241, 244.
19. Landjev, supra note 4, at 364; see 1983 O.J. (C 240), supra note 9, art. 2.
20. WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 5, at 82; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES,
LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 234 (Klaus
Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., 1985); BUXBAUM & HoPT, supra note 5, at 178-79.
21. See Bulgarian Law on Commerce, supra note 3, art. 241(2).
22. Id. arts. 241(4), 244(1).
23. Id. art. 242(2).
24. Id. art. 244(3).
25. Id. art. 243(1), (4).
26. See THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, supra note 1, at 19.
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B. THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVAKIA
According to the Czechoslovak Commercial Code, in force since January 1,
1992, the public limited company is governed by three organs: the shareholders
(through a general assembly), the board of directors, and the oversight (supervi-
sory) council .27 The powers of the board of directors are stipulated in articles
191-195. The board must have at least three members, who represent the corpora-
tion in dealings with the outside world in addition to directing the company. The
board also draws up the annual financial statements, proposes the distribution
of profits, prepares annual reports, and is responsible for keeping the company's
books and records.28 It decides on all matters except those reserved for the general
meeting by law or by the corporate charter.29
The oversight council, or supervisory board, which must have at least three
members, exercises a general oversight role, functioning similarly to the outside
directors of a U.S. public corporation. In particular, it reviews the financial
statements and submits its findings to the general meeting. Only natural persons
who are neither on the board of directors nor authorized to act in the name of the
corporation can be members of the oversight council.31 If the company employees
number more than fifty, two-thirds of the members of the council are elected by
the general meeting and one-third by the employees.
C. HUNGARY
Similarly, under the Hungarian Company Act, the corporate governing structure
of the public limited company is two-tiered. The board of directors is subject to
oversight by a supervisory board.32 The members of both bodies are elected by the
general meeting of shareholders.33 The structure is mandatory, and the company
should have at least one auditor.34 The board of directors represents the company.
It "shall establish the company and supervise the company personnel and shall
exercise employer rights." 33 Nevertheless, the founders possess some discretion in
the allocation of decision-making power within the company, because the powers
of the supervisory board and the board of directors can be largely determined in
the by-laws. If company employees number more than 200, one-third of the seats
on the supervisory board are reserved for employee representatives.
27. BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA, supra note 3, at 5-41. When Czecho-
slovakia split into the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia on January 1, 1993, both states
agreed to adopt all legislation and honor all treaties of the former Czechoslovakia.
28. Czechoslovak Commercial Code, supra note 3, art. 192.
29. Glos, supra note 4, at 562.
30. BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA, supra note 3, at 5-42.
31. Czechoslovak Commercial Code, supra note 3, art. 200(1), (4).
32. BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA, supra note 3, at 3-47.
33. Hungarian Company Act, supra note 3, arts. 285(2), 291(1).
34. Gyula Gayer, Changes in Hungarian Corporate Law, DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIO-
NALES 526 (No. 4/5, 1990).
35. Hungarian Company Act, supra note 3, art. 285(l).
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D. POLAND
The joint stock company governance structure under Polish law consists of the
general meeting of shareholders, the management board, and the supervisory board
or audit commission. 36 If the initial capital exceeds five billion zlotys (US$290,000)
the corporation has to have a supervisory board, and the latter cannot be replaced
by an audit board.37 The supervisory board consists of at least five members, who
are normally appointed by the general meeting of shareholders. However, the com-
pany bylaws can specify alternative means for their appointment. 38 The board of
directors is also elected by the general meeting, unless the corporate charter stipu-
lates otherwise.39 Under Article 378, a member of the supervisory board cannot
hold an appointment with the board of directors, and no member of the supervisory
board can be on the board of directors. The powers of the board of directors are
generally specified as management of the affairs of the company.'
The function of the members of the supervisory board is defined as the "exercise
of permanent (constant) supervision over company activities encompassing all
branches of the enterprise., 4' The directors' duties include: examination of the
balance sheet and profit-and-loss accounts; examination of the company's books
and documents (including determination that such books and documents are consis-
tent with the actual condition of the company; examination of the report of the man-
agement board and of the management board's decisions regarding distribution of
profits and covering losses; and submission of the annual report to shareholders
describing the results of these examinations.42 The members of the supervisory
board are expected to perform their duties collectively. Under article 386(1) the
board may delegate to a member the exercise of specific monitoring duties.
The bylaws may extend the duties and powers of the supervisory board. In
particular the bylaws could require that the management board receive directors'
permission prior to undertaking certain activities.43
To summarize, most of the Eastern European countries have adopted a two-
tiered governing structure for their public limited companies, thus maintaining
general consistency with the German legal system." Bulgaria resorts to the alter-
native of the one-tiered system following the Draft Fifth Directive and the French
model. Though the codes lay down most of the powers of the different organs,
these powers can largely be defined in the bylaws.
36. William Sievers & Andre Spark, Directors' Duties in Selected Markets: Poland, 8 INT'L
COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 311 (Aug. 1993); BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA,
supra note 3, at 4-55.
37. See Commercial Code of Poland, supra note 3, art. 377(2).
38. BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA, supra note 3, at 4-57.
39. See Commercial Code of Poland, supra note 3, art. 366(3).
40. BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA, supra note 3, at 4-57.
41. See Commercial Code of Poland, supra note 3, art. 382.
42. Id. art. 382(2).
43. Id. art. 213.
44. Conlon, supra note 9, at 348, 350-51.
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The two-tiered board system is a German innovation. 5 A characteristic feature
of the German economy is that most German companies are financed not through
equity but through bank loans. Thus, banks wishing to supervise the use of their
investments and to exercise general control over the direction of the companies
in which they have invested advocated the establishment of a supervisory board. 46
The classic board system consisting of outside and inside directors is typical
for a system of equity financing, such as in the United States and the United
Kingdom. 47
Although the dual board system has proved to be successful in German law
and the achievements of the German economy have added to its appeal within
the European Union, the system emphasizes creditor protection. At the same
time, German industries are dominated by a few banks and the capital market
is thin and narrow. The predominant corporate forms are the limited partnership
or the closed corporation.48 The current developments in Eastern Europe for
mass privatization and for establishing capital markets will eventually create
diffused ownership, a situation similar to that in the United States and the United
Kingdom. Thus, it is questionable whether a two-tiered board system in Eastern
European countries will have the same effect as in Germany .
III. The Duty of Care-A Country-by-Country Analysis
A. THE UNITED STATES50
Under U.S. common law corporate directors' duty of care has been drawn
partly from tort law. 5' Several formulations elaborate on the standard of care.
Generally, directors are required to exercise the same degree of care that an
ordinary, prudent person would exercise under similar conditions.52 Some courts
45. Id. at 348-49.
46. Id. at 348-50.
47. See Dine, supra note 9, at 547; Conlon, supra note 9, at 350-51.
48. Friedrich K. Kubler, Tensions Between Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: An
International Perspective: Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 57
BRooK. L. REv. 97, 102-07 (1991).
49. See, e.g., Alfred F. Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of
Development in Eastern European Community and United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1469-70 (1984).
50. For a general and extensive discussion of the directors' duty of care in the United States,
see EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKY, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS,
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES (1992); WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS (4th ed. 1988); DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGEMENT
RULE, FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS (1987); Melvin Eisenberg, The
Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 948 (1990); Bayless Manning,
The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW.
1477 (1984).
51. Norwood Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Duty of Care: Riddles Wisely Expounded,
41 DEF. L.J. 519-49 (1992); Richard B. Dyson, The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40 IND.
L.J. 341 (1965).
52. The test is an objective one. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130
(Del. 1963).
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have enunciated that "under the business judgment rule director liability is predi-
cated upon gross negligence." 53 As of today, thirty-seven states have codified
the common law duty of care.m
Section 8.30(a) of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act of 1985 states:
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member
of a committee: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care of an ordinary person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably
believes to be in the best interest of the corporation.
The American Law Institute, in its proposed final draft of March 31, 1992, of
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, 55 compels
directors to exercise the care that an ordinarily prudent person reasonably would
be expected to exercise under similar conditions.
The duty of care might be considered as the aggregate of four relatively distinct
duties:5 6 the duty of inquiry, that is, the duty to follow up reasonably on informa-
tion that should raise concern; 57 the duty to employ a reasonable decision-making
process;51 the duty to make reasonable decisions; 59 and the duty to supervise or
monitor the conduct of the corporation's business. 6°
Courts rarely hold corporate directors liable for mere negligence because of the
existence of the business judgment rule. The latter is a "presumption that in making
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
53. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
873 (Del. 1985). For analysis of the common law standard of care, see KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra
note 50, at 43.
54. See BLOCK, supra note 50, at 26; KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 50, at 38.
55. ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (Proposed Final Draft, Mar. 31, 1992).
56. See Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 948.
57. See Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920). The court held that a teller's flamboyant lifestyle
should have prompted the bank's president to inquire whether shrinkages in the bank's deposits were
the result of the teller's embezzlements. Nevertheless, the bank's directors not being similarly on
notice, were held not to have breached their fiduciary duties.
58. The directors and officers must use reasonable care and properly inform themselves when
making a decision. The test used by most states is a "gross negligence" test. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The Delaware Supreme Court held that outside directors breached
their duty of care in approving the sale of Trans Union Corporation. The sale was approved by the
board of directors at a meeting that lasted only two hours. The presentation was completely oral;
no written drafts of the agreement were circulated. The board's approval can best be described as
uncritical acceptance of management's recommendation.
59. This duty concerns the quality of business decisions. The business judgment rule provides
that a substantively unwise decision by a director or an officer will not by itself constitute a lack of
due care.
60. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). The court held liable a director
who failed to discover misappropriation of trust funds because she knew nothing of the corporate
affairs of the company, visited the corporate offices only once, and never read or obtained the annual
financial statements. The court stated that directors were "under a continuing obligation to keep
informed about the activities of the corporation," had to maintain familiarity with the financial
situation of the company, and should have performed general monitoring of the corporate affairs
and policies. Id.
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the company.'"6 Some recent statutes have even restricted liability of directors for
breaches of the duty of care. The statutes vary in their approach. For example, they
limit the money damages that may be recovered against the officer or a director,
or they have relaxed the standard, so that only more outrageous behavior will be
covered. Nevertheless, the amendments that occurred in the Delaware statute have
had the most significant impact. Under section 102(b)(7), the certificate of incorpo-
ration may contain a provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breaches
of the duty of due care.62 Interestingly enough, the American Professors Bradley
and Schipani, in an article published in 1989, showed that the enactment of section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware statute was associated with a negative effect on the value
of the corporations incorporated in Delaware.63
In conclusion, the U.S. system of corporate governance, which combines mini-
mal government intervention with accountability, has combined the notions that
directors should have all germane protections against the liability for decisions
involving risk, and that they are under a moral and legal obligation to perform
their role with due care.64
B. THE UNITED KINGDOM65
Although directors' duty of care is a cornerstone of U.K. law, 66 the standard
of care epitomized by English case law has been recognized as both unsatisfactory
and inappropriate for the requirements of the modern business world.67 In a 1925
case the court emphasized the relative nature of the duty of care. Thus, a director
need not exhibit, in performing his duties, "a greater degree of skill than may
reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience." 61 With
regard to diligence, "[a] director is not bound to give continuous attention to
the affairs of his company," but is simply obliged to attend all meetings he
reasonably can. 69 It should be mentioned that the obligation to give continuous
61. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984); see, e.g., ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c)(3) (Proposed Final Draft, Mar. 31, 1992).
62. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991); see also Michael Bradley & Cindy A.
Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV.
1 (1989); Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 969-723.
63. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 62, at 48, 60-65.
64. Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 972.
65. See DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, A COUNTRY
BY COUNTRY GUIDE 204 (Alex Roney ed., 1992) [hereinafter DIRECTORS' DUTIES]; ROBERT PEN-
NINGTON, COMPANY LAW 676-78 (5th ed. 1985); Vanessa Finch, Company Directors: Who Cares
About Skill and Care?, 55 MOD. L. REV. 179 (1992).
66. EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTEGRATION AND HARMO-
NIZATION, supra note 5, at 211.
67. A.J. Boyle, Draft Fifth Directive: Implications for Directors' Duties, Board Structure and
Employee Participation, 13 COMPANY LAW. No. 1, at 6 (1992).
68. In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co. Ltd., 1925 Ch. 407, 428 (Eng. C.A.).
69. Id. at 429.
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attention to the affairs of the company may nevertheless be required in his service
contract.70 Third, a director, in the absence of grounds for suspicion, is permitted
to trust officials to perform their duties honestly, as long as the director has
allocated such duties properly.
Directors' negligence can take the following forms: first, dishonest behavior,
which is often pleaded as negligence; second, failure to detect or prevent fraudu-
lent behavior; and third, carelessly misjudged business decision.71 At the moment,
the prevailing opinion is that since directors are endowed with different degrees
of experience and care, the only realistic duty of care that can be imposed is a
subjective one.72
Section 727 of the Companies Act of 1985 grants judges "discretion to relieve
negligent directors of liability where they are considered to have acted 'honestly
and reasonably' and, in all the circumstances, 'ought fairly to be excused for
the negligence, default, [and] breach of duty.' "7 On the other hand, section
214 of the Insolvency Act (the wrongful trading section) imposes a civil remedy
against directors based on a tough standard of care.74 The director has to persuade
the court that after becoming aware of the approaching insolvency, he or she
took every step to minimize potential loss to the company. If he or she cannot
do that, the court may order a personal contribution to the assets of the company.
The standard of care is twofold, comprising both subjective and objective criteria.
The director's actions or conclusions are judged by those of a reasonably diligent
person who has the general knowledge, skill, and experience expected of a person
carrying out the same functions as that director and the general knowledge,
experience, and skill that director has. However, this type of liability arises from
insolvent liquidation and does not relate to the company's whole trading life.75
In conclusion, the standard of care in the United Kingdom is rather lenient.
As a result, there is a call both for legal reform and for imposition of an objective
standard, as well as for developing an effective control mechanism over directors'
competence and behavior.76
C. GERMANY
Under sections 93 and 116 of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz
(AktG)),77 managers and directors should apply the care of an orderly and prudent
70. See DIRECTORS' DUTIES, supra note 65, at 204.
71. Boyle, supra note 67, at 7.
72. Id.
73. Finch, supra note 65, at 201.
74. DIRECTORS' DUTIES, supra note 65, at 204.
75. Grossfeld, supra note 11, at 4-121.
76. See Finch, supra note 65, at 214.
77. For a most recent version of the Aktiengesetz (AktG) of September 6, 1965, see NIRK ET
AL., HANDBUCH DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (1992), translated in 24 COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE
WORLD: WEST GERMANY (1990). For a commentary of the AktG, see KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELL-
SCHAFTSRECHT [CORPORATE LAW] 637-816 (1991).
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business manager ("haben bei ihrer Geschiaftsftihrung die Sorgfalt eines or-
dentlichen und gewissenhaften Geschdftsleiters anzuwenden' ).78 Therefore, the
standard is that of a person in a responsible position of authority as a manager
of other people's money in a particular enterprise.79 The member's individual
abilities are not taken into account. The test is purely objective, and the courts
will not accept unfitness or inexperience as an excuse. o If managers and directors
fail in their defined duties, they are "jointly and severally [liable] for ... [the]
damages arising therefrom.'"'"
The burden of proof is on the directors and managers, that is, they have to
show that they have adhered to the duty of due care.82 The due care requirement
is absolute and any negligence, however slight, can give rise to damages. Thus,
the burden imposed on the directors is reduced by the fact that while they have
certain discretion in the exercise of their judgment, the scope of their discretion
is probably narrower than under the business judgment rule in the United States.
Directors can be held liable not only for their own acts but for failure to control
the activities of their colleagues.83
The Aktiengesetz expressly lays down provisions stating that the standard of
diligence is equally applicable both to the management board and to the members
of the supervisory board.8" Accordingly, section 93, para. 3 of the AktG, amplifies
the circumstances under which the members of the board are specially liable if
they deviate from the provisions of the AktG: if they pay investments, interest,
or dividends to shareholders; if the stocks of the company or of another company
are subscribed, acquired, taken or received as pledge, or reduced; if shares are
issued prior to the full payment of the nominal value or of the higher issue value;
if the company property is divided up; if payments are made after the inability
to pay has been discovered or its involvement in debt has been indicated; if credit
is granted; if delivery shares have been issued in the case of conditional increases
in capital beyond the purpose established or prior to the complete payment of
equivalent value.85 To establish liability damages must have occurred.86 Directors'
duty of care cannot be decreased by the corporate charter.87
The shareholders' subsequent ratification of directors' actions will waive direc-
78. Section 93, para. 1, sent. 1 of AktG, supra note 77; see SCHMIDT, supra note 77, at 684.
79. Grossfeld, supra note 11, at 4-113; see also SCHMIDT, supra note 77, at 684.
80. NIRK ET AL., supra note 77, at 273.
81. COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: WEST GERMANY, supra note 77, § 93(2).
82. Section 93, para. 2, sent. 2 of AktG, supra note 77; see SCHMIDT, supra note 77, at 685;
Grossfeld, supra note 11, at 4-113. In contrast, the U.S. burden of proof lies with the plaintiff.
83. Grossfeld, supra note 11, at 4-113.
84. BUSINESS LAW IN EUROPE: LEGAL, TAX, AND LABOUR ASPECTS OF BUSINESS OPERATIONS
IN THE TEN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES AND SWITZERLAND 222 (Maarten J. Ellis & Paul
M. Storm eds., 1982); see also SCHMIDT, supra note 77, at 693.
85. SCHMIDT, supra note 77, at 685.
86. NiRK ET AL., supra note 77, at 279.
87. Grossfeld, supra note 11, at 4-115.
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tors' liability for damages, provided that they correctly informed the meeting. 8
Nevertheless, the current opinion is that a following ratification of a breached
duty does not relieve the directors from their liability.89 At the same time, liability
is not curbed by the supervisory council's approval of the transaction.'
In conclusion, Germany imposes a much more rigorous standard of care for
directors than the United Kingdom and the United States.
D. FRANCE9 1
Directors have a duty to manage the corporation like bonspdres defamille (good
fathers of families). The standard of negligence differs depending on whether the
director is paid or not. The former, as a rule, is held liable even for slight
negligence. The director will not be excused because of old age, deafness, sick-
ness, or insufficient ability. 92
Directors are liable for acts they have committed in their personal capacity. 9'
Articles 244 and 249 of the Commercial Law impose liability in three main
areas: (1) failure of the directors to respect statutory law, for example, provisions
governing company procedures such as calling shareholder meetings, preparation
of annual accounts, or modification of articles of association; (2) failure to respect
articles of association and, in particular, the restrictions they place on directors,
transfer of shares, and use of the company's assets; and (3) failure through
negligence or irregular accounts, and failure to deal properly with employees to
ensure correct management of the company. Director liability only arises if the
company or shareholders have suffered damage or loss. Directors can also be
held liable under the general provisions of the law of torts set out in the Civil
Code. Thus, as a general principle every fault causing damage is a source of
liability.' 4
Moreover, the president of the company is liable for all acts of deputies. Courts
have imposed on every director a duty of control and supervision over the activities
of the board. Thus, a director who wants to escape joint liability must expressly
disapprove of the board's decision. 95 Directors will not be held responsible if
88. Section 93, para. 4, sent. 1 of AktG, supra note 77; SCHMIDT, supra note 77, at 685.
89. See, e.g., NIRK ET AL., supra note 77, at 281. Contra DIRECTORS' DUTIES, supra note 65,
at 78.
90. Section 93, para. 4, sent. 1 of AktG, supra note 77; SCHMIDT, supra note 77, at 685.
91. Loi No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966 (Commercial Act); see also Decret No. 67-236 of Mar.
23, 1967 (1967 Decree). For the original French texts, see CODE DE COMMERCE [COMMERCIAL CODE]
1155-1375 (1991-92). The Commercial Law is translated in 8 COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD:
FRANCE (1992). See also Andre Tunc, The Judge and the Businessman, 102 LAW. Q. REV. 549,
554-57 (1986).
92. Grossfeld, supra note 11, at 4-115.
93. DIRECTORS' DUTIES, supra note 65, at 55.
94. Tunc, supra note 91, at 555. It is hardly possible to find a court decision in which an error
in judgment is not necessarily a fault, or in which due to the difficulties of conducting a business,
a director's decision should be regarded with some leniency. Id.
95. Grossfeld, supra note 11, at 4-115, -116.
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they can prove that they were unaware of any wrongdoing because of fraud. The
court has to examine whether a director of normal diligence could have discovered
the wrongful act.
96
Under article 246, para. 2, no decision of the shareholders' meeting can relieve
directors of liability to which they are otherwise subject. 97
The founders of the public limited company may choose between the one-tiered
or two-tiered system of corporate governance.98 However, most of the societes
anonymes (incorporated companies) are organized under a unitary board struc-
ture. 99 Under article 249, para. 1, of the French Commercial Law, members of
the executive board in a two-tiered system are subject to the same liability as is
imposed upon directors. Members of the supervisory council are liable for any
personal misconduct in the course of their duties, but are not responsible for acts
of the management."°° The supervisory board, however, will be held liable if its
members do not report offenses committed by the executive board, if they have
knowledge of such offenses, to the general meeting of the shareholders.' '
The French Commercial Law also provides for a derivative suit, which can
be filed by 5 percent of shareholders against a member of the board on behalf
of the company.'°2 The charter cannot contain a provision that makes the bringing
of the suit subject to authorization by the general meeting of the shareholders. 103
To summarize, of the four legal systems discussed here, French law imposes
the strictest standard of duties and liabilities upon directors and provides for the
best investor protection.
E. THE DRAFT FIFTH DIRECTIVE AND THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE
l04
The Draft Fifth Directive and the European Statute do not articulate a standard
of care and skill for board members. 10 5 Nevertheless, both regulations provide for
96. Commercial Act, supra note 91, art. 244; Grossfeld, supra note 11, at 4-116.
97. COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: FRANCE, supra note 91, art. 246; article 240, para. 1
of the Commercial Law, supra note 91.
98. PENNINGTON & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 5, at 49.
99. MEINHARDT, supra note 11, at F-14(i).
100. Article 250, sent. 1 of the Commercial Law, supra note 91.
101. Article 250, sent. 3 of the Commercial Law, supra note 91.
102. MEINHARDT, supra note 11, at F-14A(iii).
103. Article 246, sent. 1 of the Commercial Law, supra note 91.
104. The European Company Statute, 1989 O.J. (C 263) 41. The new Draft Directive, 1991 O.J.
(C 138) at 8 and 1991 O.J. (C 176) at 1, is a proposal by the EC Commission for a creation of a
new business organization, which will be governed by the statute and by the domestic legislation
of the Member States. For discussion of the regulation, see 2 GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES, supra
note 5, at 39-001. The provisions of the Statute follow exactly the Draft Directive. For that reason
the discussion is limited only to the Draft Fifth Directive, though it should be remembered that the
Statute has similar provisions.
The Draft Fifth Directive and the Statute have not been implemented mainly because of political
opposition from the United Kingdom. The latter contests the provisions related to employee participa-
tion in management. See, e.g., WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 5, at 86-90.
105. Welch, supra note 9, at 91.
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civil liability of members of management and supervisory boards for "breaches of
• . . [duty] in carrying out their [functions]." 06 It may be inferred that provisions
scattered throughout the Draft Directive bear upon the so-mentioned duties and
functions. As far as the one-tiered board is concerned, all management members
have the same basic duty. According to article 2 lq(2) they shall "carry out their
functions in the interest of the company having regard [in particular] to the interest
of the shareholders and the employees." We may conclude that by this wording
article 21q(2) includes the use of due care in making business decisions.10 7
Liability is joint and several without limit, but individual directors can escape
liability if they prove that no fault is personally attributable to them. "Fault"
seems to be equivalent to the meaning and use of "negligence" in the U.K. and
U.S. law. This minimum liability presumably covers any damages sustained by
the company as a result of a breach of duty by members of the governing organs
in performing their functions.' 08
The authorization of a transaction by the supervisory organ (or presumably
by the nonmanagement members of the administrative organ) shall not of itself
exempt the management directors from liability.'09 Similarly, under article 14(5)
of the Draft Directive the authorization by the general meeting of the shareholders
of a transaction that causes damages to the company does not itself exempt any
members of the board or boards of directors from liability. "0 Article 18(1) implies
that the general meeting of shareholders can renounce the right to bring proceed-
ings on behalf of the company to enforce the joint and several liability without
limit. Nevertheless, such a refusal is ineffective against any shareholder entitled
to maintain a suit to enforce article 14 liability, that is, a shareholder who holds
shares of 10 percent or more of subscribed capital."' Finally, advance renuncia-
tion is prohibited, since article 18(2) provides that damage to the company must
have occurred in order for the renunciation to be effective."l
2
The provisions of the Draft Directive and the European Statute clearly impose
a much more severe standard than the existing U.K. and U.S. law and one similar
to German and French statutory law. Nevertheless, the provisions in the Draft
Directive and the European Company Statute are problematic. "'
One difficulty is the absence of a definition of the duty of care as well as what
106. 1983 O.J. (C 240), supra note 9, art. 14.
107. Id. art. 21q(2).
108. See, e.g., 2 GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 39-007, -024; M. Raaijmakers,
European Harmonization: Quo Vadis?, in HARMONIZATION OF COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW 64,
85 (1989).
109. 1983 OJ. (C 240), supra note 9, art. 14(4).
110. Id. art. 14(1), (5).
111. Id. art. 16(1), (2).
112. Id. art. 18(1), (2).
113. 2 GoRE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 39-026.
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constitutes a breach of that duty. Therefore, it is certainly necessary to extend
harmonization in respect to directors' duty of diligence u14
Second, several provisions relating to the directors' duties are ambiguous. For
example, article 21q(l) provides that all "members of the administrative organ
shall have the same rights and duties, without prejudice to" delegation of the
conduct of management of the company or to allocation of functions among the
members of that organ." 5 This nebulous provision might be interpreted to the
effect that no difference exists between the rights and duties of management




The Bulgarian Law on Commerce, which follows closely the Draft Directive,
does not contain any distinct provisions that elaborate the standard of care to
be followed by the directors and management of the public limited company.
Nevertheless, under article 240(2), members of the management board and the
supervisory board are jointly liable for any damages caused by their fault." 6 A
member of the board will not be held liable if the court finds that the board
member has no fault connected to the damage.' 17 Interestingly enough, the board
members have to deposit security for their potential liability in an amount specified
by the general meeting but not less than their remuneration for a three-month
period. This indemnity may be in stocks or in bonds." 8
2. The Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia
As already mentioned, under the law of the Czech Republic and the Republic
of Slovakia the administration of public limited companies (joint stock companies)
is based on a two-tiered system. Members of the board of directors and the
supervisory board are obliged to fulfill their duties with due care and to maintain
confidentiality of information and facts, the disclosure of which to third parties
could cause the corporation to suffer damage." '1 As far as liability is concerned,
section 66 of the Commercial Code states that the relations between the corpora-
tion and the members of its corporate bodies are primarily ruled by provisions
on mandated contracts.
114. EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTEGRATION AND HARMO-
NIZATION, supra note 5, at 212.
115. 1883 O.J. (C 240), supra note 9, art. 21q(1).
116. Bulgarian Law on Commerce, supra note 3.
117. Article 240(3), sent. 1 of the Law on Commerce, supra note 3.
118. Article 240(3), sent. 2 of the Law on Commerce, supra note 3.
119. See Czechoslovak Commercial Code, supra note 3, § 194(5).
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3. Hungary
According to Hungarian law, a member of the board of directors or the supervi-
sory board, or an auditor, "shall be obliged to act with the care generally expected
from persons in such positions."120 If such persons breach their duties, they will
be held liable for damages under the general provisions of the civil law. A contract
with the company cannot waive liability. The liability of the senior officers is
joint and several.121 However, a director who objects to a decision and reports
the objection either to the supervisory board or to the general meeting of sharehold-
ers will not be held liable. 1
22
4. Poland
Polish law requires that directors carry out their duties with the "diligence of
a conscientious merchant," but does not precisely define the meaning of the
quoted phrase. It is not clear whether this test is objective. If it is, this test implies
that directors will be held to no higher standard than an average businessman
and are not required to have specific expertise. 123 The liability of the directors
is joint and several.' 24
VI. Conclusion
A close look at the statutory provisions related to the directors' duty of care
in the commercial laws of the examined Eastern European countries shows that
it is either absent, as in Bulgaria, or is sparsely defined. While the drafters have
evidently conscientiously copied the main provisions of the Draft Fifth Directive
and of the French and German commercial codes, the standards imposed are not
as strict as those of France or Germany. In particular, the new laws do not set
forth detailed regulation of the cases in which directors will be held liable for
violations of duties. Not clear is whether directors will be held liable for mere
or gross negligence. Interestingly enough, the Czechoslovak Commercial Code
even permits full elimination of directors' liability if provided by the corporate
charter. The Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia have launched the
largest privatization in history by selling vouchers. This process will be completed
in a few years and will place about 50 percent of state property in private hands.
Hence, an enormous number of private investors will appear on the scene.' 25
Moreover, it has been argued that the enactment of section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware statute in the United States, which states that the corporate charter
may contain provisions for eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
120. Hungarian Company Act, supra note 3, art. 32(1).
121. Gayer, supra note 34, at 523.
122. Hungarian Company Act, supra note 3, art. 32(3).
123. See, e.g., Sievers & Spark, supra note 36.
124. Commercial Code of Poland, supra note 3, art. 290.
125. See, e.g., THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, supra note 1, at 70-90.
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director, was associated with a negative effect on the stock prices of the corpora-
tions in Delaware. 2 6 Therefore, it is debatable whether that is the best solution
since the Czech Republic, the Republic of Slovakia, and all Eastern European
countries need foreign investments more than ever. Next, it is not apparent how
these provisions will be interpreted by the courts, which will certainly need
guidance in applying them. In this respect, the case law of the United States can
be used to guide decisions and to partially replace the lack of experience in
corporate and commercial matters.
What kinds of provisions related to the duty of care should be adopted and
how should the standard of care be interpreted in Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, the Republic of Slovakia, and Poland?
First, one should note that these countries have more similarities than differ-
ences in their legal systems. All are civil-law countries and had been heavily
influenced by German and French law. Moreover, all are trying to join the
European Union. Thus, this effort requires harmonization of their corporate and
commercial legislation with the proposed Fifth Directive. However, to the extent
the proposed Fifth Directive does not explicitly define the duty of skill and care
to be followed by directors and contains some ambiguous provisions, the new
democracies should try to fill the void by looking to the states with a long tradition
and development of corporate law. Hence, to provide for better investor protection
and to create more legal certainty, they should include more detailed statutory
provisions related to directors' duty of care and liabilities in their commercial
codes following the German, French, and U.S. statutory experience.
What standard of care should be adopted by the new market economies? It may
be argued that in an era of full-time directors and rising standards of commercial
education, the standards of skill and care required by directors should be high.
At the same time, however, directors should be free to take risks so that entrepre-
neurship will not be restrained. Thus, the Draft Fifth Directive, in article 14,
as well as the commercial codes of the Eastern European countries discussed,
contain provisions that directors should be collectively liable for damages to the
company that result from breaches of duty by one or more of them. The positive
aspects of this proposal are that it encourages the responsible monitoring of
directors by directors and deters directors from using delegation as a shield for
liability for negligence. The negative aspect of the rule is that it may discourage
competent persons from engaging in management or supervision of corporations
because of the risk of liability for the acts of less competent counterparts.
The need to make duties of skill and care rigorous in Eastern Europe can be
argued with conviction. The notion of the corporation comprising interests that
include those of shareholders, employees, and creditors calls for an objective
standard to measure the directors' duty of care since employees and creditors
126. See, e.g., Bradley & Schipani, supra note 62, at 48, 60-65.
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have no say in the appointment of directors.127 A more rigorous standard of
directors' duties will be one of the prerequisites to encourage investments in the
new privatized joint stock companies.
Next, whether statutory or judicially articulated standards are applied to direc-
tors' duties probably will not matter. Statutory tests will inevitably involve a
significant measure of discretionary assessment by judges. Nevertheless, it is
possible to construct a test that allows judges to consider variations in directorial
roles, but which does not ask judges to become involved in the merits of business
decisions. Directors should be judged on the functions they undertake, and their
qualifications should not prejudice them. Such a test would allow the court to
consider the size and nature of the enterprise and the skills reasonably to be
expected of directors in the role they have assumed.
In conformity with the Draft Directive, the commercial laws of all Eastern
European countries provide for a two-tiered system that involves a management
organ and a supervisory organ, with members of the former appointed and dis-
missed by the latter or the general meeting, and members of the supervisory
board appointed by the general meeting of the shareholders. These provisions
allow for continuous monitoring of the work of the management board. 28 The
supervisory board has substantial powers of inquiry, including the power to
investigate, to demand reports from the management board, and to receive a
management board report on the state of affairs of the corporation at least every
three months. Though the two-tiered system has worked fairly well in Germany,29
one of the risks is that supervisory directors will start to identify with management
directors in a scheme of shared responsibility that protects the executives from
close scrutiny by shareholders and creditors. One way to deal with the problem
is to allow a certain percentage of the shareholders to demand reports of company
affairs to supplement the reporting obligations of the supervisory or unitary board,
as defined in articles 32 and 60 of the Draft Directive.
Finally, some thought should be given to protecting the interests of small
investors in the new capital markets of Eastern Europe. To achieve such protection
shareholders should be given the main enforcement role, that is, they should have
the right to file derivative suits.130 In this respect and in line with the provisions of
127. The Commercial Code of Poland and the Bulgarian Law on Commerce do not contain provi-
sions related to employee participation on the board of directors or the supervisory council.
128. James Cox & Nis Jul Clausen, The Monitoring Duties of Directors under the EC Directive:
A View from the United States Experience, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 47-49 (1992).
129. WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 5, at 85.
130. So far, only the Commercial Code of Poland provides for a shareholder's statutory action
to sue for damages on behalf of the company. See Commercial Code of Poland, supra note 3, arts.
294, 477; Sievers & Spark, supra note 36, at 316. The Draft Fifth Directive in article 16 states that
national laws shall provide for statutory actions of shareholders against wrongdoer directors, though
the shareholders should hold at least 10 percent of the issued capital. Such derivative suits are provided
for in the United States, Germany, and France, but not in the United Kingdom.
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the Draft Directive, the ratification power of the general meeting should be limited
accordingly. 1
3
In conclusion, legislators in Eastern Europe should rethink the duty of skill
and care and adopt measures that allow those with interest in a company to counter
directorial incompetence and negligence. The creation of credible capital markets
requires as a priority measure the encouragement of increased director compe-
tence, diligence, and accountability even through imposition of a somewhat oner-
ous liability on directors.
131. See 1983 O.J. (C 240), supra note 9, art. 18.
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